DEMEA'S CHALLENGE

Discussion of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion centers on the question whether Cleanthes the theist or Philo the agnostic triumphs.[Note 1] Attention to this important question has, though, helped obscure a crucial fact about the Dialogues: the character Demea raises a fundamental challenge to which neither Philo nor Hume has a good response. Hume's strategy in the Dialogues (as I read that book) is to distinguish between what we can call ordinary and philosophical skepticism;[Note 2] to show that religious skepticism is ordinary; to establish this ordinary religious skepticism; and thus to undermine substantive religious belief. But Demea's Challenge undermines Hume's use of the distinction between ordinary and philosophical skepticism, because it undermines the significance of that distinction.

What is that distinction? Ordinary skepticism throws some beliefs into doubt by citing others that aren't doubted. When I doubt, say, that goblins exist, I engage in laudable (though not very difficult) critical thinking. We must preserve room for this ordinary skepticism. Philosophical skepticism, on the other hand, throws all beliefs into doubt. If I doubt whether fire warms, I do so because I am entertaining a general philosophical skepticism that renders even the simplest and most obvious things dubious. We must try to refute (or at least respond to) such skepticism, if we are to be satisfied with any of our ordinary beliefs and practices.

We cannot give a satisfactory response to philosophical skepticism by attacking skepticism overall, without making distinctions. For it would be a hollow victory to refute philosophical skepticism in a way that allows people to believe, fully legitimately, in ghosts and goblins and wacky conspiracy theories--in a way that prevents us from making epistemically significant distinctions among our beliefs, because it dooms us to accept all beliefs.

But we also should not protect ordinary skepticism by failing to address philosophical skepticism. For if we do not refute, or at least respond to, philosophical skepticism, no ordinary skepticism can be satisfactory. To make this point more concrete: Smith believes in goblins. I believe that fire warms. I try to be an ordinary skeptic about Smith's claim. But Smith reminds me that I am ultimately committed to philosophical skepticism, so that I am no more entitled to believe "fire warms" than he is to believe "there are goblins." For philosophical skeptics, both these beliefs are equally ungrounded. Therefore, if I am ultimately committed to philosophical skepticism, or perhaps even if I have no response to it, I cannot draw an epistemically significant distinction between Smith's belief and mine--because I am doomed to reject, or at least to impugn as rationally deficient, all beliefs.

I believe that Hume, in the Dialogues, tries to distinguish between ordinary and philosophical skepticism, and that he argues that religious skepticism is ordinary and legitimate. I believe this is the point of Philo's rejection of the Pyrrhonian label in Dialogue I; and I believe it is the right way to interpret Philo's replies to Cleanthes's arguments. I do not, however, have time here to defend this interpretation in detail (though in a moment I will say more about the interpretation, and I will on occasion draw on it, and offer some points in its favor along the way). Nor do I intend to defend, here, the claim that religious skepticism is ordinary. I will argue that Hume's response to Demea's Challenge shows that the Dialogues involve a commitment to philosophical skepticism; that Hume therefore cannot draw an epistemically significant distinction between ordinary and philosophical skepticism; and that Hume therefore cannot furnish us with a satisfactory ordinary skepticism about religion, or about anything else.

What is Hume's position in the Dialogues, and what is the challenge that so devastates that position?

This, briefly, is my account of Hume's position in the Dialogues. Hume, through Philo, tries to establish that it is not reasonable to speculate about the origin of the universe, while it is reasonable to speculate about more particular and everyday matters. For when we

confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions, and remove (at least, in part) the suspicion, which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtile and refined. But in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage . . . (D 135).[Note 3]

Demea's challenge devastates this position not by showing that religious beliefs are part of common life--that is Cleanthes's approach, and it fails--but instead by questioning the epistemic significance of the distinction between what is inside and what is outside common life.

At the start of the Dialogues, Demea defends religious belief in standard fideistic fashion. Here is Demea recommending fideism as a method of religious instruction:

While they [my pupils] pass through every other science, I still remark the uncertainty of each part, the eternal disputations of men, the obscurity of all philosophy, and the strange, ridiculous conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper submission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening to them the greatest mysteries of religion, nor apprehend any danger from that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the most established doctrines and opinions (D 130-131).

Demea's inference is correct: if he can persuade us to be skeptical about all human reasoning, then we will not believe that reason has the power to specially favor or disfavor any of our beliefs, religious beliefs included. General skepticism about reason puts all our beliefs on an equal footing. (Demea does not examine the troubling side of his inference: it leaves all our beliefs on an equally bad footing, because reason cannot support any of our beliefs. I'll say more about this point later.)

But Demea's inference will only trouble Hume if he wants to draw epistemically significant distinctions among our beliefs, and if he thinks that general or philosophical skepticism is a real problem.[Note 4] Some people believe that Hume never tries to draw epistemically significant distinctions among our beliefs. Other people believe that Hume uniformly and resolutely dismisses philosophical skepticism.

However, neither of these interpretations of Hume fits Philo's position, and therefore, I would argue, Hume's position, in the Dialogues. Philo does not want to admit that all our beliefs are on a level in every respect relevant to favor and disfavor. On the contrary, he wants to convince us of the primacy of common life--that beliefs within common life are preferable to beliefs outside of common life.[Note 5] This is the whole tenor of Philo's arguments against Cleanthes. Yet Philo flirts, in a very Humean way (as I'll explain in a moment), with perfectly general philosophical skepticism; he treats philosophical skepticism as a real, indeed as an insoluble, problem. Demea's challenge to Philo and Hume is: can you show that religious beliefs, or indeed any beliefs, are specially disfavored, in the context of general philosophical skepticism? Or, if not, can you show that general philosophical skepticism does not hold? The challenge is apt, and devastating.

All this from a character whom Hume portrays as a buffoon? Well, not exactly. Demea himself doesn't work out "Demea's challenge" with much consistency or power. "Demea's challenge" is merely a convenient label, a label that marks the origins of a belief-levelling strategy (or problem) in Demea's fideistic speech. But Philo plays an important part in developing "Demea's challenge" by recommending that we "become thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason"; Philo indeed explicitly extends Demea's skepticism from the sciences to the everyday, telling us to consider the "uncertainty and needless contrarieties" of human reason "even in subjects of common life and practice" (D 131). (Nor does Philo retreat from this point after the first Dialogue; in Dialogue 11, p. 205, he says: "We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however wild, that may not be just..."[Note 6]) In thus "improving and cultivating" "Demea's principles," Philo introduces Hume's voice into the text. That we can go wrong when our reasoning is abstruse and involved is a commonplace. That we can have no confidence we are right even in "common life," even when our reasoning is simple and about experience, is a distinctively Humean bit of pessimism, and is general philosophical skepticism properly speaking.

Of course, Philo is trying to employ Demea's own argumentative weight against him. Demea argues that reason is impotent, so can't threaten religious belief; Philo argues that, since even our beliefs about what is common and near are unreasonable, we should hesitate to embrace beliefs about what is singular and remote. We should instead stay within common life. But the last piece of argumentative judo awaits Philo: if none of our beliefs is reasonable anyway, why should we pursue some beliefs (science) and shun others (substantive religion)?

This skepticism about common life, this principle that even common life is on shaky ground, is--I have already admitted--really more Humean than Demean. However, what one chooses to call the challenge isn't important; the important point is that the shakiness of common life is incompatible with the primacy of common life, general philosophical skepticism incompatible with ordinary skepticism. For ordinary skepticism depends on the context of ordinary belief, and general philosophical skepticism undercuts all ordinary beliefs, removing the ordinary skeptic's contrast between sound and unsound beliefs.

Now even if Demea's challenge, as amplified by Philo, succeeds, it is not a fully satisfactory defense of religious belief. A defense of religious belief can hardly be satisfactory if it leaves religion and atheism on a par with each other, as Demean belief-levelling does. Cleanthes understands this point, as he shows by his canny and ironic reply to Philo's attempt to ally skepticism and faith (that is, to Philo's acceptance and extension of "Demea's principles"):

You propose then, Philo, said Cleanthes, to erect religious faith on philosophical skepticism; and you think that if certainty and evidence be expelled from every other subject of enquiry, it will all retire to these theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority (D 132).

Still, Demea's challenge counts as a defense of religious belief, however unsatisfactory, however last-ditch; for a general philosophical skeptic can't raise special problems for a believer.[Note 7] Imagine Demea challenging Philo in the following way: "Why is being part of common life such a good thing? You heartily endorse my 'principles,' Philo. You urge us to mark the 'uncertainty and needless contrarieties' of human reason 'even in subjects of common life and practice' (131); you speak of 'the errors and deceits of our very senses.' Let us suppose then that abstruse science meets, and substantive religious belief fails to meet, the test of remaining within common life. Would science then be proved reasonable, and superior to religious belief, by virtue of the support provided by our deceptive senses and our false reason? Religious belief has no warrant, if your account is correct; but then at least no belief in science or common life could triumph over religious belief."

Can Philo reply to Demea, or rather to Hume's philosophical skepticism? Philo can only resort to a principle of epistemic parsimony: Since all possible beliefs are ultimately equally irrational, we shouldn't multiply beliefs without necessity. We should believe only what we must, and certainly should not have beliefs about subjects clearly beyond our capacity (for instance, the cause of the universe). Nature compels us to have certain general ("natural") beliefs, for instance the belief that every event has a cause. Nature also compels us to have observational beliefs, that is to trust our senses, and to draw scientific inferences from our natural beliefs and our experience. But we don't have to have substantive religious beliefs; nature does not compel such belief. So the causal belief is epistemically preferable to religious belief because (1) the former belief is natural (unavoidable), while the latter isn't, and (2) it is epistemically preferable to have as few beliefs as possible.

But this isn't a satisfactory response to Demea's challenge, for we will still want to know what hold this principle of epistemic parsimony has on us, why we should obey it. After all, the principle of epistemic parsimony isn't any more reasonable, on Hume's account, than a principle of epistemic extravagance would be. That is to say: Hume's appeals to natural belief and epistemic parsimony rely on the concept of a reasonable epistemic strategy, at least in the context of the Dialogues, where he is apparently engaged in reasoned criticism of a set of beliefs. But philosophical or Pyrrhonian skepticism rules out talk of any reasonable epistemic strategies; once we have any beliefs at all, we are thoroughly tainted with unreasonableness.

Perhaps Hume would go on to say: "I describe what reflective people will do, but I can't say why anyone should be reflective." That is, Hume might say that his criticism of religious belief has only descriptive, not normative, force. But if Hume's criticism is limited in this way, it will not satisfy a reflective person, because it gives no reason for criticizing religious belief at all, for being reflective rather than unreflective.

Or perhaps Hume would say: "I am urging that we be as epistemically responsible as we can be. Sadly, we cannot be very epistemically responsible. But we can at least avoid grand conjectures when even our mundane beliefs are ill-founded." This argument is in some ways attractive, at least for people already inclined to be responsible. But, first, the argument concedes that the beliefs of common life are ill-founded, so that the claim that religious belief is ill-founded can no longer put religion at an epistemic disadvantage relative to other beliefs. (Perhaps Hume wouldn't care about that; but again, many of Philo's arguments at least seem to impugn the rational warrant of religious beliefs, in a way that suggests that other beliefs have better warrant.) Second, this plea for as much epistemic responsibility as we can muster will have no effect on those who argue that, if reason is "dead," anything--any belief--is permitted.

Some people will remark that, if we consider the broader context of Hume's philosophy, it makes sense that Hume cannot draw an epistemically significant distinction between religious and other beliefs. Perhaps religious beliefs are less natural, universal, or forceful than some other beliefs; but no belief is less reasonable than any other. But if this is the right interpretation of Hume's philosophy overall, then the Dialogues furnishes only a flimsy and disappointing criticism of religion--though some interpreters believe it furnishes a robust, perhaps even a successful, criticism.[Note 8] Worse, the Dialogues furnishes only a weak strategy for pursuing any kind of ordinary skepticism. I prefer to think that the Dialogues furnishes a potentially robust critical strategy and criticism, conditional on responding in some satisfactory way to Demea's Challenge.

Thus, although Demea is a far less sympathetic character, and a far less able controversialist, than Cleanthes, ironically Demea frames the crucial and unanswered criticism of Philo's argument. (Philo helps Demea frame the criticism; Philo in fact transforms and appropriates the criticism; but these facts do not relieve the irony.) For Philo never shows how, pace Demea's challenge, a distinction between beliefs inside and beliefs outside of common life yields good reasons to prefer some beliefs to others. When Philo does speak of preferring everyday beliefs and empirically grounded science to "the religious hypothesis," he presupposes that common life is solid, epistemically sound. But Philo nowhere grounds or proves the solidity of common life, nowhere makes explicit how and why beliefs connected in the right way to common life are preferable to beliefs not so connected. Worse, Philo concedes the shakiness of common life, and this concession marks a general philosophical skepticism inimical to the project of distinguishing between sound and unsound beliefs. To sum up: Philo, like Hume, feels drawn to some sort of philosophically grounded preference for common life; but Philo, like Hume, upon reflection finds himself committed to an extreme skepticism that undermines even common life.

By exposing this problem, I do not mean to rehabilitate Demea, or to serve the cause of "rigid inflexible orthodoxy," or to deny the apparent power of Philo's arguments against the design hypothesis and the ontological argument. I have only tried to show that Philo's arguments cannot finally succeed in their Humean context, and to raise the problem of the relation between philosophical and ordinary skepticism. Demea's challenge makes us confront the question whether we can make epistemically significant distinctions among our beliefs--whether we can use the distinction between ordinary and philosophical skepticism in criticizing some beliefs and praising others. Demea's challenge shows us that the kind of philosophical project Hume undertakes in the Dialogues can only be fully successful, fully satisfactory, if extreme skepticism about our beliefs is false, so that there are some reasonable beliefs to contrast with unreasonable contentful religious beliefs.

Thus undermining philosophical skepticism is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for establishing ordinary religious skepticism. Or, to put the point generally, undermining philosophical skepticism is a necessary condition for establishing any putative ordinary skepticism. Hume hoped to proceed with positive critical philosophizing even lacking a satisfactory response to philosophical skepticism; but his criticism of religion is incomplete because of the philosophical skepticism lurking in the background. Some contemporary philosophers think that we are well advised to ignore philosophical skepticism, even if we think the skeptic has (annoyingly) strong arguments, and get on with our business; but if we do ignore philosophical skepticism, our business must remain incomplete. For if we lack a response to philosophical skepticism, our positive critical philosophizing will be toothless.

Another way to put the moral of Demea's Challenge is this. Since Kemp Smith, it has been common to say that Hume's skepticism supports his naturalism. But Hume's extreme (philosophical, Pyrrhonian) skepticism does not support, but subverts, his naturalism--including his naturalistic criticism of "superstition." This is a problem for Hume; Hume's interpreters should acknowledge that problem; Hume's followers should confront, and try to resolve, the problem.

Notes

Note 1