Philosophy 14
Ira Singer, Hofstra University
S: Euthyphro! What are you doing here, at the court of law? Are you being prosecuted, so that you must defend yourself?
E: No; I am bringing a case against someone else.
S: What kind of case?
E: A case that is a credit to my courage, Socrates. For I am prosecuting my own father for murder.
S: That is surely a credit to your defiance of our traditions, Euthyphro! We Athenians believe that children should respect their parents, and repay their care and protection with gratitude, not with prosecution. What were the circumstances of your father's action?
E: A servant of mine got drunk and killed my father's servant. My father was enraged, and threw my servant into a pit. My father sent for the authorities, but in the meantime he neglected my servant, so that when the authorities arrived the next day they found the servant dead of thirst and exposure. This was simple murder! Moreover, my father has not even offered to compensate me for the loss of my servant. Surely such an action must be punished.
S: Euthyphro, it is hard to do what you are doing, prosecuting your own father. Many people would refrain from doing so, because they would be afraid of acting wrongly. They would not be so sure that what you describe is a case of simple murder; and, even if they were sure of that, they might not be so sure that it would be right to prosecute one's own father.
E: But Socrates, I know what is right and wrong; I know what is pious or pleasing to the gods, and what is impious or an affront to the gods. I am an expert on such things.
S: Splendid, Euthyphro! For I myself have been accused of impiety; I am on my way to court to defend myself against this charge. Perhaps you can help me to plan my defense. If you know what is pious and what is impious, tell me, so that I can confound my accusers.
E: It is simple, Socrates. It is pious to do what I am doing, to prosecute a murderer for murder, even if that murderer is one's own father.
S: But Euthyphro, is that the only sort of definition you have to offer me? I want to know what it is to be pious or impious; I do not want a simple list of pious actions. You must tell me what it is that makes a pious action pious.
E: Ah, if you want that sort of definition, I can give it to you: the pious is what the gods love.
S: That is the sort of definition I want; it tries to tell us why an action would be put on the list of pious actions. But let us see if it is a correct definition.
E: I am sure it is a fine definition, Socrates.
S: Nevertheless, let us examine it. You know, Euthyphro, that we believe in the existence of many different gods and goddesses?
E: Of course, Socrates; I am not a newborn infant!
S: And you know that our stories say that the gods disagree about many things, and quarrel with each other.
E: Of course.
S: But what would the gods quarrel about, Euthyphro? Would they quarrel about arithmetic?
E: No, they would quarrel about the sorts of things we quarrel about. They would quarrel about what is right and wrong.
S: So that, as our stories say, some gods will favor one side in a battle, while other gods will favor another side, as in the war between the Greeks and Troy. Or Athena will be pleased with Odysseus and make him a favorite, while Poseidon will hate Odysseus and try to destroy him.
E: Yes, these are well-known stories.
S: But then your definition cannot be correct, can it, Euthyphro? For if one action can be beloved by one god, and hated by another, that action would be both pious and impious. And a single action cannot be both pious and impious; it must be one or the other. So your definition was defective. But doubtless you truly are an expert on piety, and I simply haven't understood you correctly yet.
E: Certainly, Socrates. You have not given me a chance to say what I mean. Now pay attention: surely, though the gods disagree about many things, there are some things that they all agree on. For instance, all the gods hate murder. Therefore they would all love anyone who prosecutes a murderer.
S: Splendid, Euthyphro! You have proposed a new definition: the pious is what is loved, not by one god or some gods, but by all the gods; and the impious is what is hated by all the gods.
E: Now you understand me, Socrates. The pious is what is beloved by all the gods.
S: This definition sounds fine, Euthyphro. Should we therefore accept it, or should we examine it to see if it is flawed in any way?
E: By all means, examine the definition, Socrates. It can contain no flaws! I am confident my definition will survive your scrutiny.
S: Then here is my question, Euthyphro. Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious; or is it pious only because the gods love it?
E: I do not follow you, Socrates.
S: Yet you are an expert on piety. I must have spoken unclearly. Let me clarify, then: In some cases, a thing has a characteristic only because of the way people regard it. A statue might be worth a great deal of money only because people are willing to pay a great deal of money for it; then the statue would be valuable because people think it is valuable. In other cases, a thing has a characteristic in itself; and people judge it to have that characteristic because they understand it clearly. Achilles was courageous; those around him said that he was courageous; but he was not courageous simply because they said he was. Rather they said he was courageous because he in fact was courageous, and they saw that he was.
E: Yes, yes, now I understand you. But what has this to do with piety?
S: My dear Euthyphro, surely now you mock me! An expert like you could not fail to see my point. Suppose you are right that all the gods love what is pious. That fact can be explained in two different ways. Perhaps the gods arbitrarily choose to love something or other, and in so choosing make it pious. (So, if all the gods were to decide to love murder, then murder would be pious. Surely that would be absurd!) Or perhaps the gods see that an action is worthy to be loved, is good or pious in itself, and then they all love it. In that case, the piety of the action would come first, and the fact that the action is beloved by all the gods would come second. But then, Euthyphro, we would still need an explanation of precisely what you promised to explain: what is piety?
E: Socrates, I see very clearly what piety is, and I am sorry that I have no more time to explain it to you. But my prosecution is scheduled for the start of the day in court, and I must not be late.
S: Dear, dear; what a disappointment! I had been hoping to learn from you, not only how to defend myself better in court, but also and more importantly how to live a better life; for pious actions are better than impious ones, and knowing what is pious should help one to act more piously. But I suppose I shall have to do without the benefit of your wisdom, Euthyphro.
Return to the list of readings
Return to Philosophy 14 Home Page